In the face of all the latest reporting on the 18% up-tick in violent crime in Chicago there has been scarcely little discussion of cause and effect in the media or among policy makers. However, a recent admission by Chicago police spokesperson Monique Bond underscores the role that police policy and actions play in inadvertently stimulating more frequent and fierce gang violence in Chicago. The zeal with which the Chicago Police Department has gone after street corner gangs in the past has, according to spokesperson Bond, contributed greatly to the increase in deadly violence. “The department’s been focusing on targeting gang hierarchies, which have been dismantled over an extended period of time,” she said. “[That’s] causing gangs to now operate in smaller crews that compete against each other for narcotic turf, which leads to deadly violence.”1

It may be hard to imagine today, but there was once an opportunity to steer the city’s youth gangs in a more constructive direction. The forerunners of what have become today’s most hardened and violent street corner gangs once made genuine efforts to move in the direction of positive community engagement. When black youth first began forming neighborhood cliques in the late 1940s and 1950s, neighborhood confrontations rarely turned deadly.2 Gang fights, or “humbugs,” were a fairly infrequent phenomenon but were usually stimulated by competition for access to neighborhood hangouts and recreational space. Urban youth gangs had yet to become involved in the emerging international drug traffic, which at the time was created and operated by organized criminal syndicates, known locally in Chicago as “The Outfit.” In the late 1950s and early 1960s, black youth gangs developed elaborate organizational hierarchies that included official leadership positions, age groups, and female auxiliaries. By the mid-1960s, these institutional arrangements led to the establishment of administrative boards, regular weekly meetings, membership cards, and membership dues. During the Civil Rights and Black Power periods of the mid and late 1960s, black youth gangs underwent a politicization process much like non-gang youth and adults. Through various private grants and War on Poverty funding, a number of the largest youth gangs in Chicago began to acquire financial resources and important contacts beyond the scope of local municipal agencies. These resources were put to use cleaning up streets, opening youth centers, and developing employment-training programs. Of course, not all gang members chose the path of constructive community involvement. Some took up the mantel and rhetoric of self-determination to make the case that local youth gangs should have a controlling interest in neighborhood businesses, both legal and illicit.

At the very moment that youth gangs were being pulled in two divergent yet potentially empowering directions, the administrations of Mayor Richard J. Daley, State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan, and the Chicago Police Department instituted a “War on Gangs” whose impact continues to reverberate to this day. Daley and Hanrahan’s “War on Gangs” was closely timed with the FBI’s well-documented surveillance and suppression of black political figures. The Chicago political machine declared their war on gangs in May 1969. By that fall, most of the leaders of Chicago’s black youth gangs had been arrested (on charges for which many would later be found not guilty). Vice Lord leader Bobby Gore was arrested in November 1969. Two weeks later, Fred Hampton, the charismatic leader of the Chicago Black Panthers who was attempting to orchestrate a peaceful coalition of the city’s youth gangs, was killed by Chicago police and State’s Attorney’s detectives in an aggressive and controversial raid on the organization’s headquarters.

Over the next two decades, the Chicago police department continued its war on gangs. In addition to repeatedly wiping out the youth gangs’ leadership structure, this policy contributed to some of the worst human rights violations perpetrated by any police department in the United States. As acknowledged in the CPD’s own internal investigation known as the Goldston Report, between 1972 and 1993, Commander Jon Burge led a ring of officers who used electroshock, mock executions, and an assortment of other torture techniques to extract confessions from over one hundred black male youth, many of whom had gang affiliations and some of whom were completely innocent of the assumed criminal conduct.

During the tenure of Superintendent Phil Cline beginning in 2003, the “street corner conspiracy busts” were heavily pursued.3 This tactic builds a conspiracy case around a single gang and a single drug spot. The results of the case usually involve the prosecution of the gang leaders in addition to the street-level dealers. The street corner conspiracy busts quickly became popular within Chicago police hierarchy because, as Superintendent Cline acknowledged in an interview discussing Operation Snakebite which targeted the Mickey Cobras gang, such operations “[make] us feel like we are making a difference.”4 Moreover, the Chicago mainstream media coverage surrounding these cases was always very positive for the department.

But what are the larger costs? It is extremely important that the administrators of the criminal justice system make sense of the impact their actions have on communities throughout Chicago. How the Chicago Police Department approaches the enforcement of laws plays a significant role in shaping the future of communities throughout Chicago.

Short-term effects:

• There is no longer a single gang in control of a drug spot.
• Violence is immediately generated by this void as rival gangs and individuals come in to take over the recently vacated drug spot.
• There is now a leaderless clique of gang members that have to fight for their ability to control the drug spot or live in the same area they once controlled unchallenged.

Long-term effects:

• As these busts add up, there is a significant increase in leaderless cliques of youths on the streets lacking any local affiliations to structure or restrain their actions.
• Cliques and individuals that once were affiliated now fight against each other as well as against other gangs.
• These cliques are now on-their-own and usually without a means to support their existence as they have now lost control over the drug spot that was their only means of material income. We are left only to guess at the amount of other crimes generated by their lack of access to their former means of economic support.
• If any clique seeks to return to their once coveted spot, their only option is a resort to collective or individual violence, often resulting in a homicide by handgun.

What the CPD lacks is the desire or capacity for a rigorous assessment and evaluation of their past policy of war on gangs and street corner conspiracy busts.

Despite spokesperson Bond’s recognition that past police actions have contributed to increased youth violence, there is no acknowledgment by higher officials within the CPD and criminal justice system that this policy is a violence generator and not a violence eliminator. No community should have to live with violent gangs in their midst. The critical matter is to implement the least destructive and most constructive path to realizing that goal.

There are indications that a change in police policy and strategy may be on the horizon:

“Bond said the department is working on developing gang-fighting strategies to try to dismantle the smaller, younger and more fractionalized gangs. “Law enforcement is having to adapt to that and looking at different kinds of ways that are outside the traditional ways that we’ve been using to attack gang violence,” she said.”5

If we as Chicagoans truly want reduced levels of violence in our low-income high-crime neighborhoods then we must be prepared to face the unvarnished truth. It is neither ethical nor moral for authorities within the system to receive great press coverage for taking down the leadership of a gang when in reality the true outcome is a greater increase in the loss of life visited upon that community in the near future. Achieving a long-term reduction in gang violence associated with the illicit drug traffic will not be quick or easy. Nor will it involve the large-scale arrests and long-term incarceration of our youth. Long-term reductions in urban violence can only be achieved through long-term investment in our black and Latino youth and low-income communities of color. That solution however, will demand a creative and courageous stance on the part of our political leadership– one that seeks to build up our struggling communities as opposed to tearing them down. This means having a political and police authority that does not seek to make political points by callously blaming the city’s violence on poor parenting as was recently done by Mayor Richard J. Daley and Superintendent Jody Weis. Unfortunately, the history of police politics in the city of Chicago suggests that political posturing is more important than the lives or our young people.

By: Tracy Siska and Joey Lipari of the Chicago Justice Project

Notes
1. Monique Bond, Chicago Police Department Spokesperson, Chicago Tribune, Aug 6, 2008.
2. Of course, it is important to note that white youth in Chicago had a long tradition of forming neighborhood gangs to defend their turf and absorb whatever political and financial spoils might come their way. These gangs, or “athletic clubs,” began to wane at the very same time that black youth gang membership began to explode. This trend follows closely the post-World War II demographic shift of whites to the suburbs and increased African American migration to urban centers.
3. During the 1980s, Cline took over as commander for Jon Burge in Area 2. After Burge’s transfer allegations of torture continued to pile up by his men under Phil Cline’s command.
4, See interview with Phil Cline at the Department of Justice web site.
5. Monique Bond, Chicago Police Department Spokesperson, Chicago Tribune, Aug 6, 2008

Lack of access to criminal-justice-related information hinders the ability of public access to the actions of the criminal justice agencies and their agents. Few Chicagoans have heard of the Chicago Police Board, let alone have a working knowledge of how it operates. Yet this organization plays a significant role in the process of removing abusive officers from the city streets of Chicago. We have examples of the results of their work in the Cozzi case. To the Chicago Police Board it was not a “dismissible offense” to club to the head ten times a wheelchair-bound, handcuffed, elderly man.

Chicago Police Officer Gerald Callahan has now joined the list of infamous officers accused of violent attacks resulting in their arrests. Callahan was arrested in Niles, Illinois, on suspicion of attacking a 61-year-old man in a bar. The reason that I am addressing this issue now is that the Chicago Justice Project has used the Illinois Freedom of Information Act to obtain documents from the Chicago Police Board. These documents were initially created when the CPD tried to fire Callahan back in 2006. In our FOI Center you will find copies of many relevant documents involved in the case in Adobe format (.pdf).

In the following paragraphs you will find a detailed listing of the charges brought against Callahan by Chicago Police Superintendent, Phil Cline. The charges were part of the beauracratic process that is involved in trying to discipline and fire Chicago Police Officers. The process is, to a certain degree, “set in stone” through the collective bargaining process between the City of Chicago and the Fraternal Order of Police, the union representing the officers.

If you want to know more about how the Chicago Police Board operates you can read a previous post on that subject or visit their web site.

In 2006 Superintendent Phil Cline charged Callahan with the following violations:

• Rule 1: Violation of any law or ordinance

“On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the
Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan threatened Sgt. Ray Young, Star Number 2013, with physical hamland/or lunged at Sgt. Young, thereby violating Chapter 720 ILCS 5/12-2( a), by committing the act of Aggravated Assault.”

Found Guilty!

• Rule 2: Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department

“Count I: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at 1718 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan threatened Police Officer Grant McGrane by stating, “I’m gonna dump your ass in the garbage can. I swear to God I will. I’ll kill your ass,” or words to that effect, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”

“Count II: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at 1718 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan threatened Police Officer Christopher Krol by stating, “I’ll kick your ass anytime and throw you in the garbage can,” or words to that effect, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”

“Count III: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours at 1718
South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan, while in the presence of Police Officer Grant McGrane and/or Police Officer Christopher Krol, made threatening statements referring to Police Officer Timothy Fundarek by stating, “You can tell that rat motherfucker Fundarek that I swear on Ireland I will rip his fucking head off and piss down his fucking throat. I swear to God I’ll kill the son of a bitch,” or words to that effect, thereby impeding that Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”

“Count IV: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours at 1718
South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan, while in the presence of Police Officer Grant McGrane and/or Police Officer Christopher Krol, made threatening statements referring to Police Officer Mark Harmon by stating, ”I’m gonna kill his ass and dump him in the garbage can,” or words to that effect, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”

“Count V: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours,while
on duty at the Altemate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan threatened Sgt. Ray Young, Star Number 2013, with physical harm and/or lunged at Sgt. Young, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department”
Found Guilty!

“Count VI: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Altemate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan threatened Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013, by stating, “You are lucky he’s here, or I would hurt you more,” or words to that effect, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”
Found Guilty!

“Count VII: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while
on duty at the Altemate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald Callahan repeatedly swore at and/or made derogatory statements to Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”
Found Guilty!

“Count VIII: On or about March 25,2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald Callahan repeatedly swore at and/or made derogatory statements to Lieutenant David Naleway, Star Number 367, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”
Found Guilty!

“Count IX: On or about March 25,2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty, at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald Callahan refused to obey one or more direct orders given to him by Sergeant Terrance Cochran, Star Number 894, to submit to a breatha1yzer exam, thereby impeding the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or bringing discredit upon the Department.”
Found Guilty!

• Rule 6: Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral

“Count I: On or before March 7, 2004, Police Officer Gerald Callahan observed misconduct by Department members and failed to immediately notify a supervisor and/or prepare a written report, thereby violating General Order 93-03-02B.”

“Count II: On or about March 25,2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty, at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald Callahan refused to obey one or more direct orders given to him by Sergeant Terrance Cochran, Star Number 894, to submit to a breathalyzer exam, thereby violating General Order 93-03-05B.”
Found Guilty!

• Rule 7: Insubordination or disrespect toward a supervisory member on or off duty

“Count I: On or about March 25,2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan was insubordinate and/or disrespectful towards Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013,when he threatened Sgt. Young with physical harm and/or lunged at Sgt. Young. “
Found Guilty!

“Count II: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Altemate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan was insubordinate and/or disrespectful towards Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 201 J, by stating, “You are lucky he’s here, or I would hurt you more,” or words to that effect.”
Found Guilty!

“Count III: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while
on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan was insubordinate and/or disrespectful towards Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013, by repeatedly swearing at and/or making derogatory statements to Sgt.Young.”
Found Guilty!

“Count IV: “On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while
on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan was insubordinate and/or disrespectful towards Lieutenant David Naleway, Star Number 367, by repeatedly swearing at and/or making derogatory statements to Lt. Naleway.”
Found Guilty!

“Count V: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan was insubordinate and/or disrespectful towards Sergeant Terrance Cochran, Star Number 894, in that he refused to obey one or more direct orders given tohim by Sgt. Cochran to submit to a breathalyzer exam.”
Found Guilty!

• Rule 8: Disrespect to or maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty

“Count I: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at 1718
South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Police Officer Grant McGrane by stating, “You’re a rat motherfucker,” or words to that effect.”

“Count II: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at 1718 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Police Officer Grant McGrane by stating, “I’m gonna dump your ass in the garbage can.I swear to God I will. I’ll kill your ass,” or words to that effect.”

“Count III: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at 1718 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Police Officer Christopher Krol by stating, “You’re a rat motherfucker,” or words to that effect.”

“Count IV: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at 1718 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Police Officer Clu1stopher Krol by stating, “I’ll kick your ass anytime and throw you in the garbage can,” or words to that effect.

“Count V: On or about March 25,2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013, when he threatened Sgt.Young with physical harm and/or lunged at Sgt. Young.”
Found Guilty!

“Count VI: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013, by stating, “You are lucky he’s here, or I would hurt you more,” or words to that effect.”
Found Guilty!

“Count VII: On or about March 25,2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013, by repeatedly swearing at and/or making derogatory statements to Sgt. Young.”
Found Guilty!

“Count VIII: On or about March 25,2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan disrespected and/or maltreated Lieutenant David Naleway, Star Number 367, by repeatedly swearing at and/or making derogatory statements to Lt. Naleway.”
Found Guilty!

• Rule 9: Engaging in any unjustified verbal or physical alteration with any person while on or off duty.

“Count I: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at 1718 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan stated to Police Officer Grant McGrane, “I’m gonua dump your ass in the garbage can. I swear to Goel I will. 1′11 kill your ass,” or words to that effect, thereby engaging in an unjustified verbal altercation.”

“Count II: On or about March 7, 2004, at approximately 2315 hours, at ] 718 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois, Police Officer Gerald Callahan stated to Police Officer Christopher Krol, “I’ll kick your ass anytime and throw you in the garbage can,” or words to that effect, thereby engaging in an unjustified verbal altercation.”

“Count III: On or about March 25, 2006, at approximately 2000 hours, while on duty at the Alternate Response Section, 2111 West Lexington, Police Officer Gerald W. Callahan stated to Sergeant Ray Young, Star Number 2013, “You are lucky he’s here, or I would hurt you more,” or words to that effect, thereby engaging in an unjustified verbal altercation.”
Found Guilty!

The question remains, how many charges would Callahan have to be guilty before the Police Board relieves Callahan of all of his duties?  One would think that Callahan’s refusal to subject himself to the breathalyzer test, by itself, would suffice as a reason to relieve him of his duty as an officer of the Chicago Police Department.

Of all of the violations listed here that Callahan was found guilty of, he was only suspended of his professional duty for approximately 22 weeks.. With the lack of access and media attention on the work of the Chicago Police Board we are left wondering how may other Callahans or Cozzis are still out there waiting to be exposed by hurting innocent people.

The following is the tally of the votes cast by the Chicago Police Board in the Callahan case:

Approved Decision
• Vice President Scott J. Davis Partner, Mayer Brown LLP
• Victor M. Gonzalez Executive Counsel, UniCare Health Plans
• George M. Velcich Partner, Belgrade & O’Donnell PC
• Arthur J. Smith Sr President, Art’s Enterprises
• Dr. William C. Kirkling Dentist, Private Practice

Dissented from Decision:
• President Demetrius E. Carney Partner, Perkins Coie LLP
• Patricia C. Bobb President, Patricia C. Bobb & Associates
• Rev. Johnny L. Miller Pastor, Mount Vernon Baptist Church

This post is the final in a five part series examining the anti-violence program CeaseFire.  The first four parts of the series covered: The Illinois Auditor General’s audit of CeaseFire finannces, Northwestern’s evaluation of CeaseFire, media’s coverage of the program, and the role race plays in the defining of effectiveness of the program.  Today’s post covers the issue of an epidemiologist’s perspective on violence reduction and the short comings of that approach. 

Honestly, this might be the most important question involved in any of the issues surrounding CeaseFire.  Slutkin comes from a public health background and approaches the issue of violence prevention and reduction from this background.  He employs an approach that operates from a perspective that presumes that the “natives” (residents of communities of color) need cultural and behavioral modification, not education and employment.  His approach, in effect, attempts to treat the behavior without treating the causes of the behavior.  His perspective is based on the faulty logic that violence is a virus running loose in communities and that only a public health approach to an outbreak of a virus can work to reduce violence.  His approach includes using community members to persuade other community members into behavioral changes that will lead to reductions in violence.

Slutkin’s approach misses in many ways including:

• Slutkin’s philosophy promotes violence reduction before economic issues can be addressed.  CeaseFire is not geared towards creating jobs.  If you accept that violence is embedded in alternative economies, then a reduction in violence can only be accomplished by a reduction in the participation of such economies or the permanent removal of the need for violence in alternative economies, which have no access to courts to mediate conflicts or provide basic protections for the most vulnerable.  There is a racist belief held by much of the American public and media that youth of color opt for participation in alternative economies over true living wage employment.  This idea is based on superficial white media coverage of these communities and not based on a realistic understanding of the fundamental lack of opportunities within inner city communities of color throughout Chicago.

• CeaseFire relies completely on a single assumption.  CeaseFire assumes that the interrupters are interceding in violence that will lead to a series of retaliatory attacks; thus, this single act of interruption will eliminate a series of violent reprisals - a reverse domino effect if you will.  This would only be true if CeaseFire’s interrupters were interrupting large-scale gang conflicts for turf or drug spots.  This type of violence is the kind that is embedded in participation in the alternative economies.  I seriously doubt that much of this type of violence is being reduced because control of turf and drugs spots is vital to a gang’s financial and physical well-being.  Membership in the gang is not maintained by being talked out of violence but instead being a leader in its perpetration. 

• If this assumption is faulty and CeaseFire’s interrupters are not stopping a chain of violent attacks in the early stages then it would be hard to believe they are really having a major impact on violence and homicide rates.  Would not our $7 million dollars of tax payer money be better spent trying to prevent large scale gang violence like competition for turf and drug spots than these seemingly individual acts of violence that may or may not lead to further violence down the road?Violence is embedded in the participation in alternative economies including the selling of drugs or one’s body.  No anti-violence program will ultimately succeed without addressing the fundamental economic inequalities that exist in communities of color throughout Chicago.  The absolutely dismal economic opportunities that exist in many of these communities must be addressed before any program of violence reduction can be effective long-term.  Any other alternatives will be nothing more than band-aid approaches that communities of color have seen come and go for decades without any long-term success.

• There is extensive media coverage of the various different types of street violence because the media loves to scare up ratings; however, the media and CeaseFire ignore the most prevalent types of violence.  The most prevalent types of violence are embedded in our families and include spousal abuse and sexual violence against our children and our female family members.  Rape experts will tell you that only approximately 20% of rapes nation wide are perpetrated by strangers, leaving approximately 80% committed by those known to the victim like partners and family members.

• Slutkin’s approach relies on assumptions that shootings can be reduced via behavioral modification through the use of interrupters.  This approach to some degree relies on the criminological theory of rational choice- an approach that is based on the idea that individuals make a rational choice to either commit or not to commit the violent act after weighing the benefits and consequences.  This approach, however, completely ignores the various different levels at which violence is embedded in the economic and social circumstances of particular communities.

Long lasting violence reduction in our city will only occur through an intense redress of the racial, economic, gender, and sexual inequalities that exist in our city and are rampant in communities of color.  Our Richard Daley has completely disregarded communities of color throughout his tenure as our Mayor.  It is only the last several years he has started to pay attention- and his attention has come in the form of using public money to relocate residents of many of these communities out of the City to the suburbs.  Gentrification of course, is also a political process.

Daley has done nothing to be a force for job creation in communities of color that has been so devastated by the loss of industrial jobs.  Instead Daley has been on a campaign to make Chicago a globalized city- one based on information technologies and the international markets.  This has served to further marginalize residents of our poorest communities.  During Daley’s tenure as Mayor, the gap between the rich and poor economically and educationally has grown larger than ever before in the history of our city.  Only a fundamental change in public policy- to one that is targeted at creating low and no skill jobs and the use of public money to strengthen communities of color rather than destabilizing them-will bring a long term reduction in street violence over time.

If you have been keeping up with my series you know that little in the way of true evidence has been brought forward to validate the assumptions made by CeaseFire administrators and other program backers. This has not stopped the Chicago media and academia from eagerly joining the chorus of individuals and institutions calling for the reinstatement of State funding for CeaseFire. You can read other installments from the series here: 1,2,3.

This has made me wonder what role race has played in the decisions made by backers of the program. Specifically, would legislators, academia, and the media be so quick to back a program carrying the burdens CeaseFire is carrying if the program was headed by a Black/Latino(a) academic rather than a White? If the program served mostly white communities and black administrators shaved a percentage off the top without ever disclosing that procedure in any of its financial paperwork would the reactions be different? My answer is yes! The media has given a tremendous amount of credibility to Slutkin without ever really sinking their teeth in deeper to the issues surrounding CeaseFire’s activities.

One has to question if politicians believe that it is better to give anti-violence money targeting communities of color to White academics rather than directly to community members? The answer to this question is important because it helps us explain why Ceasefire blossomed as it has. Anyone interested in reducing red tape and making sure that the money given was put to the most use would not seek out a middleman based at a university without good cause. Why exactly, does money directed to North Lawndale have to pass through the University of Illinois? Is it because the non-profit community partners based in the troubled communities cannot be trusted to handle the money or fulfilled their obligations under the grant agreements? Well, in contradiction to this belief the Auditor General of Illinois stated in his audit of CeaseFire that community partners that received their money straight from the State were more likely to fulfill the terms of the agreement than if the money went through CeaseFire.

Focusing on the existence of CeaseFire through a race lens reveals that prejudice plays a major role is why CeaseFire exists. Prejudice helps determine why a white academic institution is needed as a filter to determine who does and who does not get anti-violence funding from the state. Prejudice helps policy makers feel better about giving the money out because it is going to a White academic and not directly to some hoodlums in a community of color. Prejudice helps explain why a White academic with no background in criminology or criminal justice issues receives huge amounts of funding from the State for work in communities of color. It also explains why the media can explain away financial impropriates revealed in the audit by saying they are minor accounting errors. Can anyone out there really tell me this would be the position of the major media in Chicago if the program were run out of neighborhood organization in Woodlawn or Auburn Gresham?

The great sham! Does CeaseFire work? Well, I think I have put a few kinks in the armor of those that would claim they have social science research to verify the successfulness of this program. Why then is this program so widely acclaimed and what does that have to do with race? CeaseFire is a liberal’s dream program because it pays ex-gang members to now work on the streets towards a noble goal, the reduction of violence. The problem is that there has yet to be created a way for us to determine with any validity that the program is successful in any of their efforts. Now this being Chicago and Illinois this did not stop the program from growing handsomely. Why you ask? Because politicians who had it operating in their communities could use the program as propaganda.

Politicians who received funding to have CeaseFire operating in their communities could claim success in reductions that CeaseFire would claim they made in the specific areas. See, both the politician and CeaseFire gained by these claims and the validity of the claims was not as important as the ability to claim it worked. See, it is a conspiracy, but one of like-mindedness and not of overt agreements to be dishonest. The politicians know that there is no way CeaseFire can be validated so all they need is to obtain the funding for the program in their area and they can claim victory because CeaseFire will always claim they have made reductions. CeaseFire, like any institution, could be counted on to propagandize their achievements or claimed achievements every year; thus, both the politicians and the CeaseFire would benefit from the claims of success without every having to prove if the program worked. Once a politician received funding for the program in their particular area the crime reductions were automatic; it is almost like they were purchased with the funding check.

Race enters this process in three specific ways:

• First, only a White academic could obtain such funding merely on propaganda rather than results without ever having to prove his/her claims. An academic of color would have been discovered long before the financial problems were exposed at CeaseFire. Also the media would never have given an academic of color the instant credibility that Slutkin has received.

• Secondly, the funding that was going to CeaseFire could have gone directly into communities of color; thus, instead of building up a bureaucracy at UIC there would have been dozens of more jobs in communities of color. Since Slutkin’s main theory is about violence reductions before addressing economic inequalities this may not bother him; but I am pretty sure these communities could use these jobs.

• Third, all the communities that are in desperate need of violence reductions are communities of color; thus, by continuing to fund a program that is not working we are continuing to make poor attempts at addressing the needs of these communities.

These communities have seen decades of white liberal approaches to help that instead resulted in their own profit. One has to question if CeaseFire is a repeat of the same lame liberal attempts at helping poor communities deal with problems of violence.

The Chicago media and their reporting on the anti-violence program Ceasefire. Part III in a series.

In today’s installment we take a closer look at the reporting from the Chicago media on the issues surrounding the re-initiation of State funding of Ceasefire. In previous installments we have examined in detail the audit of Ceasefire’s handling of State money by the Auditor General of Illinois. We have also taken a closer look at the Federally funded Evaluation of Ceasefire from Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. Given this context we now take a look at the reporting that was generated surrounding the audit and the evaluation.

There is little doubt that for those that only seek a cursory examination the anti-violence program Ceasefire is a delicious story to report on. A story that reads: State money used by a famous epidemiologist to empower ex-gang members to reduce violence in their communities through talking individuals out of violence. Put together with an independently completed federally funded academic study to verify that the process works along with testimonials from community members and legislators about how badly the program is needed in their communities. Who could possibly want to look any deeper? We now know that the Chicago media did not want to look any deeper.

The media in any democracy has a responsibility to distrust all that is provided to them until the material or information is verified. In the case of Ceasefire the Chicago media drank the juice before really ever looking to see who made it and why it was being provided. In a previous installment I provided details about how the audit completed by the Auditor General of Illinois detailed what can only be described as very serious financial issues with the management of Ceasefire. While this audit played a role in the removal of funding from the program; it obviously should play no role in the decision to refund the program according to the Chicago media.

A common practice of the Chicago media is that it suits its purposes to have a very short memory. This practice allowed the editorial boards from both the major dailies in Chicago as well as other local journalists to support re-instituting State funding without having to once again redress the allegations brought to light in the audit. The journalists were overpowered by the “liberal appeal” of the project rather than the realities of how the project was being administered and how the project could not come close to accounting for any of the successes it was claiming.

Examples: Editorials

• “Ceasefire needs outside help to continue vital work; The governor’s cuts weren’t based on the merits of Ceasefire.” Sun-Times editorial September 17, 2007

• “The governor’s cuts weren’t based on the merits of Ceasefire, which as been praised by community leaders, Mayor Daley, and even the governor’s own administration.”

• “The group {Ceasefire} boasts success in helping to reduce the number of shootings in areas where it works. Early results of a study now being completed at Northwestern University’s Institute for Policy Research back up those claims”

Really, I thought the final results did not even do this. How did the early results of an academic study accomplish something that the final results did not? This is just another example of why social science results need to be carefully examined before being released to the media and the public. This editorial proves that the Sun-Times editorial board just gobbled up and ran with the fact that the community leaders praised the program without every looking independently to verify if the program was working. Even when the Sun-Times was presented with the results of the audit they were ignored in favor of the “irresistibly delicious” narrative of Ceasefire successes.

• “Let CeaseFire fight” Chicago Tribune editorial November 13, 2007

• “Five Chicago murders of young people who shared one other distinction: They were shot in — or, in Barrera’s case, quite close to — neighborhoods that the anti-violence group CeaseFire has been forced to abandon for lack of money from Springfield”

It is most important in times of violence and grief that the media act responsible and contextualize in broad perspectives the day’s events; because, otherwise the media may either willingly or unwillingly be a major cause of the passage of bad public policy. There are really too many forces at work in situations of violence in Chicago to just blindly assume or infer that the de-funding of Ceasefire had a role in these five deaths.

• “In August, Gov. Rod Blagojevich vetoed $6.2 million that legislators had budgeted for CeaseFire as part of his broader dispute with legislators over funding priorities. In September, a spokesman for the governor said CeaseFire should find different sources of revenue to pay for its operations.”

Once again the results of the audit are conveniently bypassed for a more conspiratorial explanation. Politics must be at work because everyone says this program is working, right? I mean there really isn’t a reason why alderman and other politicians would be less than honest about how the program is working, they don’t have any reason to lie, right? The fact is that everyone from local politicians to the media drank from the same cool-aid without every verifying that it was actually working. Anything, including a damning audit, that was brought to the discussion was quickly ignored or marginalized because it contested the narrative that Slutkin weaved for the media. The job of the media is to challenge narratives, not swallow whole and then regurgitate them verbatim.

Examples: Eric Zorn

The following two examples contain quotes from questions and answers that were exchanged between the authors and myself. In the case of Eric Zorn from the Chicago Tribune the exchanged took place on his blog. In the case of Alex Kotlowitz from Northwestern University the exchange that is quoted took place via email. PDF versions of the exchanges in their entirety can be found in our FOI Center. Where I quote form the exchanges I have shortened the questions for space considerations, the PDF versions are complete. Kotlowitz and I did speak by phone between the time I sent the original email and he responded in writing. No information from that phone conversation is included in this blog.

• “Blagojevich can fix gaffe on Ceasefire.” Eric Zorn column – Chicago Tribune May 13, 2008.

• “Friday, Northwestern University released a 229-page report concluding that gun violence dropped 17 percent to 24 percent in six of seven neighborhoods where CeaseFire mediators were in place. The three-year study commissioned by the US Department of Justice offered the most striking proof yet that CeaseFire’s trained peacemakers-“violence interrupters”, who are often former gang members themselves-really do save a significant number of lives.”

As referenced in any early post in this series Skogan was unable to parcel out what exactly were the causes of reduced violence (if there were really any) in the neighborhoods covered by CeaseFire. Zorn and the rest of the Chicago media made no attempt to seek out voices that could give an alternative view to the rosy picture painted by Skogan. I believe my post on the Evaluation by Skogan demonstrates the significant flaws in the study and its results.

• “CeaseFire’s analysis of police data suggests this {cut in CeaseFire funding}has resulted in 170 additional shootings since September.”

Zorn here is using data spoon fed to him by the program’s founder to demonstrate the plight of the neighborhoods that CeaseFire was forced to reduce staff. As a social scientist I cannot imagine a reliable and valid method Slutkin could have used to create this number. As I remember from my statistics and quantitative methods classes pulling numbers from thin air or orifices is not acceptable social science practice.

• “I didn’t read the audit itself but I read about the audit (which came out after Blago cut CeaseFire’s funding, by the way) and discussed it with Slutkin even though I doubted I’d have any room in the confines of the 600-word column to go into it” (Zorn blog, May 14, 2008)

This was a response I received from Zorn when I questioned him about whether or not he had read the audit because it played no role in his column. Wow, I wonder how much more our most important journalists in Chicago haven’t read about when covering issues. Here Zorn admits to relying on other journalists to do his research, I wonder if they read the audit?

• “Blocking the Transmission of Violence” Alex Kotlowitz, The New York Times Magazine, May 4, 2008.

• “Last year, CeaseFire lost its $6 million in annual state funding – which meant a reduction from 45 interrupters to 17 – as part of statewide budget cuts. One State Senator, who ordered an audit CeaseFire (released after the cuts, it found some administrative inefficiencies), maintained there was no evidence that CeaseFire’s work had made a difference.” (New York Times Article, page 10)

Kotlowitz’s articles ran twelve pages and yet this is the only mention of the audit with no true context of the findings. Two sentences were all that Kotlowitz could devote to the findings of an audit performed by the Auditor General of Illinois that had many damning findings. This is a clear example about how the media that covered CeaseFire refused to engage any of the criticisms of the program and instead ran with the narrative that Slutkin has spun without challenge.

Via email I asked Kotlowitz “I am curious about why the contents of the audit performed on the finances of Ceasefire did not play a larger role?” His response was “The audit was, indeed, mentioned,” (Kotlowitz email May 15, 2008). Mentioned is the correct word because that is all that occurred.

• “Nonetheless, in a report due out later this month, independent researchers hired by the Justice Department (from which CeaseFire gets some of its money) conclude that CeaseFire has had an impact” (New York Times article, page 10).

If Kotlowitz was going to mention the results of the study he should have sought out alternative voices to validate to critique the results instead of blindly running with the results without questioning them.

• “Wes Skogan, a professor of political science at Northwestern (disclosure: I each there) and the author of the report said, “I found the statistical results to be as strong as you could hope for” (New York Times article, page 10).

I wonder if other social scientists outside the authors thought the statistical results were strong. I wonder if Kotlowitz had the room in the 12-page article to maybe quote other social scientists. One reason he could not is that he was quoting the authors of the study before the study was released; thus, there was no way the results could be verified. Kotlowitz used the results of a yet to be published study as a tool to validate his perspective, and Slutkin’s narrative on CeaseFire and then also quoted the author of the yet to be released study about the strength of their findings.

It is very important for the media to be ever vigilant about the so-called “effectiveness” of programs. We live in a city where just about every program has been bastardized or corrupted entirely. The media has a responsibility to seek out alternative voices to check what officials are telling them about the program is correct. Skogan and the researchers at Northwestern are famous for their pro-police and official program biases. Does this automatically invalidate any research done by the authors, maybe not. What it should do is force journalists to treat the results skeptically and seek out alternative ways to validate their results. It is pretty clear that along with Zorn and Kotlowitz both of the major dailies’ editorial boards also drank the cool-aid.

The supporters of Ceasefire were looking for validation in the way of the “independent study” from Northwestern and they gobbled up the results. The problem is that the study did not come down from the heavens but instead was authored out of Northwestern. This is the same group of authors that repeatedly validated the CAPS program, Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy.

The public has been denied a serious and rigorous discussion about the issues surrounding reinstituting the funding for Ceasefire because media failed to do its job. The funding of anti-violence programs is very important to many communities in Chicago, communities where people from the media don’t live or ever venture into. My criticisms about Ceasefire are directed at the leadership and the idea that there is a need to centralize funding for anti-violence programming at a university. I am not really sure what a white epidemiologist from UIC knows about preventing violence in North Lawndale or Woodlawn that people in these communities don’t already know. This question by the way has never entered into the public discourse because the media has continually rejected legitimate criticisms of the program in favor of the narrative spun by Slutkin and the Northwestern researchers.

This blog is part II of a multi-part series discussion issues surrounding the re-funding of the anti-violence program Ceasefire.  You can check out  the previously posted blog titled “The Audit of Ceasefire…..(Part I in a Series)“  You can also find every documents mentioned in the series available in PDF format in FOI Center.  Part III will cover the media coverage of the recent push by Ceasefire to get their State of Illinois funding restarted.

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One of the greatest problems with social science based research is the question of when the general public should access the results and how they should be interpreted. This problem is no clearer than in the ongoing issues surrounding the Evaluation of the non-violence program Ceasefire conducted by the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. This report specifically, and social science generally, is incapable of determining with any reliability that Ceasefire achieved any of the results the report claims the program did achieve.

This report made no attempts to control for the impact of external issues on the level of violence. The Chicago Police Department and Ceasefire are mutually claiming influence for the crime drops in the areas that Ceasefire worked in. Maybe they both had an impact, maybe just one did, or maybe the crime reduction, (if there is one), is due to a still undetermined extraneous variable that the academics, the police, and Ceasefire administrators have missed. Other agencies have been involved also, including the US Attorney’s Office and their Project Safe Neighborhood.

The major problem with such mediocre social science research is that it is usually done in conjunction with an agenda and released to the media as if it is gospel. I will address the problems with reporting on this evaluation and the audit in my next installment. Suffice it to say, Eric Zorn from the Tribune and Alex Kotlowitz from Northwestern who authored an article in the New York Times Magazine swallowed deeply when it came to the findings of this Evaluation without ever questioning the methodology or the results.

The Evaluation:

• All of this came to a head in summer 2007, when state politics slipped into a standoff between the governor and the General Assembly. Legislators’ requests to fund specific Ceasefire sites were among the many member initiatives listed in a routine “pork barrel” bill the Governor’s staff systematically axed the program from the final budget. (Executive Summary Page-9)

• Most of the remaining criticism in the document focused on run-of-the-mill accounting errors that easily could have been made while trying to manage more than 20 active sites. The audit had been initiated by longtime critic of Ceasefire, a powerful state senator representing city’s South Side and a prominent leader of the Illinois Legislative Black Caucus. (Chapter 3 – Page 3-23)

• Many observers wondered whether the audit was unbiased, and certainly the exquisite timing of its release was damaging to Ceasefire: the media focused on the audit as the budget cut. (Chapter 3 – Page 3-23)

This seems like amidst a federally funded social science program evaluation the authors made a political decision to categorize the removal of funds from Ceasefire as a political choice rather than as a result of the horrific audit. Skogan also seems to be rather unhappy that the State initiated an audit of the program and even raised the possibility of a conspiracy against the program citing the exquisite timing of the release of the audit. Even if the initiation of the audit was politically motivated their suspicions were obviously verified. It is so nice being able to review the findings of such unbiased social science research. This type of work is why citizens have little to no faith left in social scientists.

• 192 months (16 years) of data on selected sites and matched comparison areas to examine trends in violence. (Executive Summary Page -16)

How nice it must be to get access to 16 years of violence data from the City. I wonder what one must do to get that type of data? This is a major critique of the clique of academics that do get access to this data, what do they do to get it in the first place and how do they continue to get access? The Chicago Police Department (CPD) is extremely restrictive about who gets access to data they create. It is clear that the CPD will not release data that can eventually be used against them to critique their actions; thus, it is the responsibility of all academics to question the legitimacy of all research that is based on what can only be thought of as coerced access. Is there some sort of overt or covert deal cut or understanding made, I do not know; but I must question the legitimacy of the access.

• Another statistical analysis focused on gang homicide. It utilized social network analysis to examine the effect of the introduction of Ceasefire on networks of within-gang and between gang homicides, and the number of violent gang active in the area. (Executive Summary Page -16)

I attended a lecture by Wes Skogan at UIC many months ago. During this lecture he presented an unpublished paper and contributed the crime drop in Chicago to Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), increased incarceration, and smarter policing. Strangely enough Ceasefire was not mentioned in his talk. At that talk Skogan was questioned about the legitimacy of how police label murders gang related. Skogan responded by saying that the CPD have a strict policy they follow. Skogan brushed aside the fact that in Chicago there just might be political influence over how a homicide gets labeled gang related. Any analysis based on the gang related definitions from the CPD would have to thoroughly explain how the CPD used this policy and to prove the policy’s reliability in determining whether or not the homicide was truly gang related. Per Skogan’s standard method of operation he automatically makes the assumption that the CPD’s methods are legitimate. This assumption tarnishes any statistical research flowing from the analysis using the CPD’s numbers.

• The program helped push gun homicides down only in Auburn Gresham, but the report discusses the statistical problems associated with analyzing these relatively rare events. (Executive Summary Page -17)

Even in Chicago murder statistics have been proven to at the very least be controversial if not out right doctored. Given Ceasefire’s ability to reduce shootings one would still have to question why homicides only fell in one area due to Ceasefire. I guess in the other areas the shootings they prevented were from people with bad aim?

The major criticism of this study is:

How are the researchers parsing out what effect is caused by Ceasefire and not caused by some other variable?

The politics surrounding crime and homicide rates are intense in Chicago and Cook County. Every criminal justice agency in Chicago and Cook County has claimed a role in reducing crime since 1990. Depending on which agency is giving you data the researcher is obliged to reinforce the agency’s role in reducing crime. Skogan has long been a strong advocate of CAPS’ role in reducing crime throughout the City. CAPS role in crime and violence reduction is just as un-provable as Ceasefire’s role in violence reduction. Does this mean that the programs are failures because you cannot prove their success? I would say no, but adding the obvious fiscal management problems at Ceasefire it is even more important to determine the successfulness of the program.

Some of the possible intervening variables that cast doubt on this study:

Chicago Police Specific:

• Hot Spots Policing in the areas covered by Ceasefire including Special Operations Section, Deployment Operations Center, Targeted Response Unit, district level hot spots, etc…
• New Gang unit approaches to those beats
• New Tactical unit approaches to those beats
• Presence of Pod cameras
• Recent street corner conspiracy busts to remove targeted gang leadership in the area
• CAPS

Criminal Justice System Specific:

• Increased levels of incarcerated individuals
• Special programs by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office
• Project Safe Neighborhood run through the US Attorney’s Office

Society Related:

• Declines are actually due to continuing drop in crime nationally since 1990 and are completely unrelated to any intervention
• Other interventions in the community not associated with Ceasefire
• Gentrification is ongoing in the city and may have played a role in selected communities
• Settling of drug markets reduces violence

While I cannot prove decisively that any of the possible intervening variables are the causes, if there are any, of the reduced violence in the areas covered by Ceasefire, the researchers also cannot prove that they are not. This evaluation is loaded with assumptions that have not even been close to validated by this study or any other study. This is why researchers should not release research to the general public before the social science community gets a chance to assess its credibility. The media has taken this story and run with it like the results of this study came down from the heavens. In reality this study should be published in an academic journal and never be seen by the media and policy makers. It certainly should not be used to motivate public policy. One can only question why this study was released to the media? This question along with the media coverage of this issue in general will be the subject of my next installment.

Introduction to series:

One of the goals of the Chicago Justice Project is to enhance public discourse on issues where an open public discussion has been lacking or on issues where the discussion requires a greater degree of factual evidence. Nowhere is this more needed than in the discussion to re-fund the antiviolence program Ceasefire. Gary Slutkin, the administrator of Ceasefire, has recently made a strong behind the scenes push to get his program’s Illinois state funding restored.

Coinciding with this effort several very favorable media articles appeared in both Chicago dailies and the New York Times Magazine, as well as an extremely favorable column by Eric Zorn of the Chicago Tribune. All of the media coverage has either ignored the audit completed by Office of the Auditor General of Illinois or dismissed the audit’s findings by attributing them to mere accounting deficiencies that could easily be corrected and should not prohibit the program from future state funding.

Those that support the project have so far refused to openly discuss the findings of the audit. CJP believes that this is a mistake because all publicly financed projects must be held accountable for their actions, especially projects that are as potentially constructive as Ceasefire violence reduction model. Cited in much of the ongoing news coverage was a recent DOJ funded evaluation of the project by researchers at Northwestern University. I will address this study in a later part of this series. The scientific validity of the results of the Northwestern study leaves much to be desired.

In today’s installment I will dig into the results of the state audit and discuss why the findings are serious enough to prohibit future funding of the project with the current administrators of the program in place. My critiques of the program that are contained in this series are not in any way meant to be an attack on the notion of hiring former gang members. Those that have survived the urban gang experience have much to contribute to any solution that communities will find to gang violence. My critiques are also not aimed at the belief that local community driven agencies are not to some degree part of the solution. Rather, I argue that centralizing the funding through the Ceasefire program may not be the best way to get antiviolence funding to these communities.

You can find the documents mentioned in the series in PDF format in our FOI Center.

Ceasefire facts:
Ceasefire Revenues Fiscal Years 2004-2006 *
• State - $11,069, 600
• Foundations - $2,985,505
• Federal - $1,782, 249
• County - $324,640
• Total Revenues: $16,161, 994

From which State Department’s the money was distributed: *
• Illinois Department of Corrections - $6,750,000
• Illinois State Police - $1,500,000
• Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority - $1,100,000
• Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Development - $750,000
• Illinois Violence Prevention Authority - $734,600
* Source: Audit of Ceasefire conducted by Auditor General’s Office of Illinois

Findings of the Auditor General William G. Holland:

• Chicago Project use of Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity FY04 Funding differed significantly from the purposes contained in the contract between UIC and the State. Funds were not used in the budgeted amounts but were transferred to other lines.

Close-out documentation submitted June 15, 2005 - six months after the end of the grant period – showed that the Chicago Project spent 33 percent more than budgeted for the total of personal costs and fringe benefits; spent less than 1 percent on travel; and spent none of the money provided for subcontractors. The subcontractor funding was scheduled to be used for clergy mobilization; however, the Chicago Project used it toward the increased personnel and fringe benefit line items. DCEO followed appropriate Departmental procedures by sending follow-up correspondence to the grantee to obtain submission of the close-out report; determined upon review of the received document that it contained excessive variances; and has neither accepted nor approved the close-out report as of July 17, 2007. (Page V)

• UIC information showed that $884,848 had been charged to the DCEO grant in their financial system - $134,848 more than the total grant from DCEO. A UIC official indicated that the grant was overcharged and that transfers to other grants wee processed during close-out. In May 2007, the official could not tell us what other grants these transfers went to. On July 27, 2007, 4 days after our exit conference, UIC officials provided information on the transfers; however, the information failed to adequately clear the issue. (Page VI)

• UIC and the Chicago Project did not have an adequate system in place to ensure that contracts had been properly executed in a timely manner. As a result community partners were allowed to initiate work without a written agreement in place.

In 18 percent (7 of 39) of the subcontracts reviewed, the agreements were not executed until after the performance period for the contract had expired. (Page VIII)

• Community partners did not always receive the entire amount of funding provided by the General Assembly and outlined in the State budget. State funding agreements make no mention of giving the Chicago Project any discretion in utilizing funding provided by the State. During the audit period:

The 39 community partner subcontractors received 83 percent of the named funding in State contracts from the Chicago Project.

Over $1.1 million was withheld by the Chicago Project, generally during the FY05 and FY06, for program support expenses like the hiring of violence interrupters and core administrative functions.

We found that the amounts withheld were not always consistent from community to community.

There were other non-State funding sources that provided funds for similar activities, such as violence interrupters salaries and administrative functions of the Chicago Project. (Page IX)

• In addition to the $1.1 million in community monies withheld for expenses paid by the Chicago Project, there was a significant total of the community funding remaining that was not spent by the communities but rather for purposes determined by the Chicago Project. In our sample of 15 subcontractors, 16 percent of the total subcontract during FY04 through FY06 for those selected subcontractors were not paid out by the Chicago Project. The total amounted to $352,000. Failure to expend all State funds in the communities designated in the appropriation bill by the General Assembly, and detailed in the contract between the State and UIC, circumvents the Intent of the General Assembly. (Page X)

• While State contracts indicated specific amounts for specific communities, we found that the front-line community partners seldom received the entire amount designated in the State budget. (Page XI)

• Funding was provided by the DOC (Department of Corrections) through a memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the Department and UIC. We found that, during FY06, DOC provided funding for Ceasefire outside the payment terms of the agreement. Additionally, during FY06, we found that the Chicago Project was charging an administrative fee to each of the community line item amounts that was not delineated in the MOU with the Department. (Page XII)

The Auditor General goes on to note additional problems associated with the program and its ability to hold community partners accountable for their work. That said, not a single critique listed here from the audit has much to do with the quality of work from community partners and has everything to do with the decisions made by administrators of the Ceasefire program.

It is clear from the audit that Ceasefire played fast and loose with the State’s money and failed to live up to its responsibilities under the contractual agreements it entered into with the various state agencies. To date Ceasefire has yet to explain why it withheld a percentage of the money directed to its community partners, on average about 17%, and spent that money on personal and fringe benefits. It is important to remember that Ceasefire engaged plenty of community partners and withheld money as a regular practice and failed to detail it in the contracts with the State. This certainly seems unsettling at the least and leaning toward underhanded or deceitful. Any non-profit that got caught failing to detail what it was doing with this much money as part of the daily operations of the organization would face the loss of their funding. This problem is not an accounting error, it starts from the time Ceasefire sends in a grant proposal with the State and continues into the daily operations. No other explanation can be logically assumed without the inclusion of a purposeful desire to deceive the State on the withholding of part of the money directed to its community partners.

The allegations contained in the audit and detailed here have not made it into the press coverage associated with the push to restart state funding of the project. Slutkin has been very adept at marginalizing critics of the project and framing the loss of state funding in the context of the budget crisis in the summer of 2007. In later additions of this series I will talk about how Ceasefire was the beneficiary of State politics not the victim. Ceasefire lost its State funding because of the highly questionable financial dealings it engaged in, not because of State politics.

Additional parts of this series will cover:

• Review of Northwestern University’s Evaluation of Ceasefire
• Media and their role as accomplice to Ceasefire’s activities - “forget the facts - it is too much of a feel good story for us to read the audit!”

What are the citizens of Chicago to make of the rash of violence that broke out over the weekend of April 19th?  I would love to say that we have free access to crime statistics to determine how this seemingly outrageous rash of violence is different then we have experienced over the last several years.  The problem is that with the current restrictions on access in place the public does not have the ability to make these comparisons.  The Chicago Police Department (CPD) restricts access to almost all of the data they create unless they deem the release of the data in their best political interests.

For argument sake I will accept the media’s argument that this last weekend’s violence was extremely large and outside the bounds of other warm weather spring weekends in the past.  By doing this I bring forth the next logical questions that this blog desires to take on:

1.    What should our response be? 

The situation that the citizens of Chicago and its police department find themselves in is not unique.  In the past these incidents have been the motivation for terrible crimes perpetrated by agents of the criminal justice system against members of poorer communities in Chicago.  It is very important that all of us do not over respond to the violence.   Each time a member of our city loses his/her life to violence, it is a tragedy.   What we must guard against is using our police force for missions they cannot possible complete.   The CPD was never designed to prevent violence; the CPD is a reactionary tool and it is beyond their capabilities to be a preventive force as currently designed.  Murder like most other violent crime is a sociological problem and not one that the CPD has ever been equipped to topple.

The majority of the violent crime in the city is centered in the most troubled neighborhoods.  These neighborhoods are highly concentrated with residents that have been most impacted by the loss of industrial jobs and the complete disregard for public schools shown by the Daley administration during his long tenure as our Mayor. The criminal justice system in Chicago and Cook County is wholly incapable of dealing with these sociological problems.  Our response to these crimes must be centered on long-term sociological cures and not political expediencies.  Without redress the continued joblessness and lack of education will only fester and motivate replication of these crimes for years to come.

2.    Who is at fault?

The criminal justice system has some responsibility for what transpired over the last weekend.  The criminal justice system has decimated the communities where this violence has occurred.  The CPD and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office have made their quota numbers from pillaging the male populations, and now ever increasingly abusing the female populations of these communities.  The criminal justice system has disenfranchised whole generations from these communities from voting and the ability to get work in any number of fields.  The affects of the work of the criminal justice system in these communities does result in violence, participation in alternative economy, and gang membership.  The fact is that the effects of predatory criminal justice agencies and policies increase gang membership and drug use.  Chicago policy makers continue to try to defeat gangs, poverty, and lack of education with violence and prison.  There are few to no successes in their efforts over the last 15 years; maybe it is time to take a different road.

Policy makers bear responsibility for the actions of the criminal justice agents and agencies.  The criminal justice agencies cannot continue to be turned to as a solution for sociological problems, they are not the cure.  Policy makers continue to take the path of least resistance to reelection, lock up anyone young and of color, especially males.  Policy makers in Chicago have never tackled real world solutions to poverty and a lack of education.  Policy makers need to live up to their responsibilities and make the hard political decision of defunding the criminal justice agencies to a degree.  The money saved needs to be put towards sociological solutions to prevent another generation growing up in Chicago in complete poverty with no education.

3.    What about the CPD’s ability to reduce crime?

I am not a believer that the CPD played a large role in the reduction of crime and violence in Chicago over the last 15 to 20 years.  Crime and violence decreased across the country since the early 1990s.  If the CPD’s role was significant in Chicago then one would have to believe that all the disparity policies and procedures throughout the country were responsible for the reductions in crime and violence in their jurisdictions.  The alternative theoretical perspective is that there has been something else going on that we have yet to uncover that affects the nation as a whole and has little or nothing to do with local criminal justice policies.

Under Superintendent Phil Cline the CPD used hot spots policing to flood communities with police when violence flares up.  Cline was also responsible for the creation of the street unit of the Special Operations Section (SOS).  Units like SOS and the Targeted Response Unit (TRU) were to be used to repress violence in communities.  In the end the SOS unit ended up being totally corrupted and was illegally arresting individuals just to get their house keys and rip off their homes.  I am not exactly sure, but I do not think this is what the public had in mind when they wanted the police to reduce violence.

Even if the CPD is able to repress violence, they are not curing any social realities that are the root cause.  We are continually stuck in a circle of violence and repression caused by gangs and our criminal justice system.  Policy makers need to have the courage and change course from the doomed one we cannot find the strength to turn off of.

Some terrifying statistics that more vividly demonstrate the problems we have with our criminal justice system in America as a whole include:

•    As a nation we have over 6 million of our residents under the control of the criminal justice system.
•    As a nation we imprison 25% of the world’s prisoners.

It took the appointment of an FBI agent to the post of Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) for the CPD to rid themselves of the low hanging fruit. Closer looks at the two cases in question demonstrate the complete incompetence of the criminal justice system in Chicago to regulate itself. These two cases call out for the “bad apples” explanation, one the Chicago media has been all to ready to accept, without realizing that in reality these cases are perfect examples that explain why the public needs greater access to data created by these agencies. The public itself must regulate the actions of these agencies because the agencies themselves have no interest in living up to their responsibilities.

Case 1:
In the first case, CPD Officers Michael Bernichio and Daniel Murphy are alleged to have arrested two men, Morris Wynn and Wayne Guy, for possession of a controlled substance in 2004. They wrote up identical police reports for each man arrested. This is where it gets tricky. It is physically impossible for both men to have possessed the drugs independent of the other man; thus, one of those reports was obviously false on its face. “The officers ended up arresting Wynn and releasing Guy, but they mixed up the reports and charged Wynn under Guy’s name. Wynn was convicted and spent 29 months behind bars before the case was overturned,” (Chicago Tribune, April 15, 2008).

An important question is how this arrest got past the various levels within the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (CCSAO) when it came time for trial. One would have to think that the CCSAO would have some protocols in place to verify the work of the officers. The CCSAO is supposed to be a check and balance on police powers; this is why we have two separate agencies. Obviously the CCSAO either does not have such protocols in place, they are not properly designed, or they were ignored. The media reporting on the issue does not mention the prosecutor on the case; obviously, the prosecutor had no obligation to make sure he was prosecuting the proper individual.

Are the courts independent of both the police and prosecutors? If so, then how could a case come to trial and result in a guilty verdict when the name of the man charged does not match the name of the man sitting as the defendant? Was the judge asleep at the switch? Are there not protocols to guarantee that the work brought into court by the officers and the prosecutors is verified or is its validity just assumed? It certainly seems like the validity of the material brought to the court by the police and prosecutors were just assumed to be valid and probably did not get scrutinized enough. Is the adversarial process of the Cook County Criminal Courts so impotent that they could not even discover through the process that the name of the man charged and the defendant did not match? If so, then the criminal justice system in Chicago and Cook County is truly broken. It could be worse, the court could have possibly known about the mistake and allowed the trial to go forward regardless. If so, then the system may be more then broken.

Questions:

• One would have to question why the officers would fill out two separate reports in the first place? What was to be gained by doing so? Is this policy or were there more corrupt motivations behind it?
• I cannot help but wonder how many times before this arrest the officers in question had filled out separate reports claiming mutually exclusive facts?
• Did the prosecutor involved in the case know that these officers filled out at least one bogus police report and ignored this fact and continued the prosecution?

Case 2:
The second case involves CPD Officer John Haleas, a Grand-Central District officer accused of falsifying information in drunken driving arrests. In this case it seems like some of the checks and balances worked, even though a closer examination shows how that is really not the case.

The Chicago Tribune Reported:
In the Haleas case, two prosecutors in training who were riding with Haleas on patrol in 2005 raised questions about a DUI arrest he made because of not following proper procedures. After prosecutors reviewed the arrest report Haleas filed, they asked for an internal affairs investigation. Haleas had previously been honored for making more DUI arrests than any other police officer in the state of Illinois. Cook County prosecutors have dropped 50 DUI cases he brought and began reviewing 500 additional cases last year. The 12-year veteran is charged with four counts of perjury, four counts of official misconduct and two counts of obstruction of justice (Chicago Tribune, April 15, 2008).

Haleas was once honored in the State of Illinois for making the most DUI arrests of any other police officer. It seems like Haleas had a practice of cutting corners and the prosecutors had a track record of either missing his misdeeds or looking the other way to get their convictions. They obviously did not have a track record of closely examining his work for deficiencies. In the reporting, the CCSAO is said to have dropped charges in 50 of his cases and is reviewing 500 additional cases. Why does it seem like reviews only happen in a reactionary fashion and that they are not part of the daily operating procedures of the system?

The CCSAO seems to have failed repeatedly at identifying an officer who was not following protocols during his DUI arrests. I guess an important question is whether or not the CCSAO ever reviewed his cases before bringing them to court for prosecution? It would seem an important thing to do. I am sure the cases were reviewed for the likelihood of conviction.

Haleas was the arresting officer on at least 500 cases of DUI and during that time the Court was incapable of discovering his lack of following the rules. Are judges paying attention while they sit on the bench? How could a single officer reek such havoc on the system without a judge noticing what was going on?

Answer: The Court working Group:
In the academic field of criminal justice the phrase “courtroom working group” refers to the close working relationship between the cops, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys. The idea is that because of the overburdened system all the actors are forced to pay little attention to individual cases and instead be more concerned with efficiencies of the system and courtroom. While this definition leaves something to be desired it does explain why such inappropriate behavior by police officers fails to get uncovered by others who are to be a check and balance on their work. These are some of the results of the courtroom-working group:

• The reality is that about 95% of the cases that reach the Cook County Criminal Court are plea-bargained away without anyone ever taking the time to do the due diligence needed to uncover patterns of misbehavior.
• Prosecutors are promoted for convictions and not for letting people out of prison or trials that are innocent. There is little to no rewards motivating prosecutors to closely examine the work of police officers. In fact, they are rewarded with bogus convictions by not examining the work of officers.
• Police officers are promoted through the number of arrests they make; thus, there is clear motivation for officers to overstep their authorities or work around protocols in hopes of making arrests, whether they be good or bad arrests.
• Police are keenly aware of the phenomena of the courtroom working group and the percentage of cases that are plea-bargained. This reality further motivates officers because they know the current state of things; nobody is watching what they do!
• Race and class intersect: There is little doubt that the officers involved in misdeeds know that the system ignored the pleas of corruption or abuse from people of color. Both the Burge and the SOS sagas prove that out vividly. There is little doubt that the officers involved know the system will pay attention if the defendant is white or has money but pays no attention if the defendant is Black/Latino/a or poor.

With the turnover occurring in the higher ranks of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) I thought it prudent to look at a forgotten battle going on in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The results of the case in question, Diane Bond, can be reviewed here, Kalven blog. A case is currently pending before the Appeals Court on whether or not to release the names of officers with 10 or more civilian complaints during a specific five-year period.

The Chicago Police and the Daley administration have been fighting hard not to release the list with the officers’ names listed. Last summer prior to the vote on authorizing the creation of the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA), the City released the list with the officers’ names redacted. Aldermen— who are the highest level of oversight over the police department in the city— requested the list.

The lawyers working for the alderman, the corporation counsel, refused to release the list citing privacy concerns for the officers. The result, the aldermen have obtained outside counsel and are intervening in the Bond case to open the documents. This could only happen in Chicago, one branch of the city refusing to give information to another, one that is higher up on the food chain by the way. Maybe the alderman should pass an ordinance cutting funding immediately to the corporation counsel’s office until they hand over the full list.

Today’ blog is about the arguments recently filed with the Appeals Court by the City still attempting to hide the officers’ names. I will take issue with many of their arguments and delineate how the lack of access to justice related information hampers oversight within the criminal justice system in Chicago. All quotes are from the following document: (REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS)

1. “Thus, if this list were released in unredacted form, it would unfairly brand officers, by name, with unproven labels like the ones Kalven uses,” (page 9)

This assumption is based on a faulty belief that the public cannot determine between legitimate allegations and false accusations. The Chicago Police Department has a sophisticated media management mechanism that can easily put forth arguments on behalf of wrongfully accused officers. On a daily basis press releases issued by the CPD end up in a verbatim form in the daily papers and on the nightly newscasts. An argument from the CPD that they lack the ability to fight an effective battle in the media is shallow at best.

2. “Indeed, the Alderman’s position in this court is that the need for disclosure outweighs officer privacy and other interests, and the Alderman stress that their constituents ask them for information that is contained in the materials,” (page 11).

The question here is whether or not there is reason for citizens in a democracy to have access to the operations of a publicly funded agency that works on their behalf in their community. Additionally, this agency’s employees have license to use deadly force and restrain the liberty of citizens on mere suspicion. With the never ending continuation of scandals of police abuse for the last 100 years it might be time that citizens are up to data on the inner workings of the CPD. Community members trusted the department over the last twenty years and were victims of the following scandals for their trust: Marquette 10, Austin 7, Gangs – twice at least, Special Operations Section. I might have missed a couple it is so hard to keep track. Still now the City says they do not want to violate the privacy of officers, less they forget some of these officers have already violated the bodies and lives of community members on more than one occasion. How many times and which officers, the City does not want us to know.

3. “The Alderman have performed the functions they describe for decades, and have had a myriad tools at their disposal to acquire whatever information they actually need to do so,” (page 12).

Seriously now, this quote must have been included to entertain the judges. What mechanisms do they have to gain the information they want? They have tried to ask their own lawyers and were rebuked because they ‘do not need to know.’ Could someone imagine the FBI telling the majority of congress that they are refusing to turn over a list because they do not need to know? Only in Chicago is such arrogance tolerated, Mara Georges and whoever else in the Corporation Counsel’s Office who refused to turn over this material should have been immediately terminated. I would fire any lawyer that worked for me that refused to give me information I asked for. This assumption is false on its face.

4. And, finally summary reports about complaints are open to public inspection, except to the extent the information in the reports is exempted by the Illinois FOIA, collective bargaining agreements, or other laws. (Page 13)

This is a delicious piece of propaganda. Should the lawyers for the city not know when and if the Illinois FOIA – collective bargaining agreements – or other laws affect the release of the reports prior to filing this brief with the Court of Appeals? I thought I was the only one that got this legalized run-around when I sent in my FOIA requests. I did not know I was in the company of federal court appellate judges also. I feel much better about myself know.

5. “What is more, the City Council, like more legislative bodies, has long had the means to investigate the enforcement of ordinances, and the actions of municipal officers, agents, and employees,” (page 13)

I would recommend rereading my earlier critiques as they apply readily to this assumption. No matter how many times the City states it, it simple is not true.

6. “The Alderman’s desire to have the CR files cannot possibly overcome the privacy and other concerns raised by releasing the officers’ personnel information, particularly in conjunction with their names, which we explain in our briefs,” (page 15-16)

The City here is stating that the privacy concerns of the officers outweigh the right of citizens to know the history of complaints for the officers working in their communities. It seems relevant to me for people in the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago to want to know if a particular officer working in their community has a history of abusing latino/a suspects. Just as it is relevant for residents of the Woodlawn neighborhood to know if a cop working in their community has a history of abusing blacks.

7. For its part, the FOP is squarely on our side, having filed an amicus brief in opposition to lifting the protective order.

Having the Fraternal Order of Police on your side is not a positive for your side. The FOP is one of the main obstacles to Chicago putting into place a meaningful mechanism for accountability in this city. The FOP resists every effort the City makes to root out corrupt and abusive officers. If the FOP had the interests of the good cops at heart they would help the city create a mechanism to root out bad cops and policies, instead the organization has done the exact opposite. The FOP can be viewed as only a tool to enhance the opportunities for abuse and corruption in the ranks.

Does my argument mean that I believe every accusation included in the complaints described here is legitimate, no. But just like people that are questioned in violent crime investigations and never charged because they had nothing to do with it, they will get over it and their life will continue much like before. Does the side effect of bad publicity mean that police should not investigate to make sure the individual did not have something to do with the crime, no. The issue of police accountability is no different. The public cannot trust that the City or the CPD really have the citizens’ interests at heart. They have never demonstrated such in the past, so why should we believe them this time?